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PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS IN
RULINGS ON THE UNIFORM ACT ON
BLOOD TESTS TO DETERMINE PATERNITY
ROBERT JOHNSTON
Commonwealth v. Goldman I provides an example of the re-
luctance of a court, in a jurisdiction that has adopted in its
entirety the Uniform Act on Blood Tests to Determine Paternity,2
to modify the existing statutory and common law presumptions
operating in favor of the legitimacy of any child born in wed-
lock.
The act as adopted in Pennsylvania applies to "a civil
action in which paternity, parentage or identity of a child is
a relevant fact" and authorizes the court to order the mother,
child, and alleged father to submit to blood tests. On refusal
of any party, "the court may resolve the question of paternity,
parentage, or identity of a child against such party." The
single most important section of the Act as far as the Goldman
case is concerned is section 5, which provides that "the pre-
sumption of legitimacy of a child born during wedlock is over-
come if the court finds that the conclusion of all the experts
as disclosed by the evidence based upon the tests shows that
the husband is not the father of the child." 3
In their comments on the Uniform Act, its authors gave
these reasons for writing section 5:
A new provision referred to in section 5 has been drawn
relating to children born in wedlock claimed to be illegiti-
mate. Most states have a strong presumption of legitimacy
-in fact, a conclusive presumption of legitimacy of
children born in wedlock except in such situations as impo-
tency, non-access, and a child of a different race. As to
all other situations, the child is conclusively presumed to
be legitimate when born in wedlock. This is based on
social policy today. It has also been influenced by the
3 199 Pa. Super. 274, 184 A.2d 351 (1962).
2 9 ULA 102-114.
3 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, secs. 307.1-307.10 (1961).
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difficulty of proof with certainty. Where blood tests could
determine with absolute accuracy the non-paternity of a
child born in wedlock, the presumption should yield.
Therefore, this act is drawn to include those cases. 4
The Goldman case was an action by the wife against her
husband, with a divorce pending, for support of minor children
born during wedlock. The defendant husband filed a petition
denying paternity and praying for an order requiring submis-
sion of the necessary parties to blood grouping tests. The
court ordered the tests under the Pennsylvania Uniform Act,
and, on an appeal by the wife affirmed the order, holding
that the act applies to such a proceeding despite the birth of
the children during wedlock and the absence of other evidence
to rebut the presumption favoring the legitimacy of children
so born.
While the opinion accepts the interpretation of the Act
that its authors clearly intended, it does so unwillingly:
But the legal rules devised to support legitimacy were
... based upon an evident desire of the courts to preserve
the sanctity of the family. The rules were deemed "es-
sential in any society in which the family is the funda-
mental unit" and were "founded in good morals and
public decency."
We recognize that there is something disgusting about
a husband who, moved by bitterness toward his wife,
suddenly questions the legitimacy of her child whom he
has been accepting and recognizing as his own. Except in
rare situations the rules of evidence have heretofore pre-
vented his doing this.
... By providing a new method to overcome the
presumptions of legitimacy, the legislature has opened
avenues to a husband to question the paternity of his
wife's children which never before were available to him. 5
4 9 ULA 108-109.
5 Supa, note 1, 354-55.
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As a ground for excluding the case at bar from the ap-
plication of the Act, the dissenting opinion uses Art. 3, Sect.
3 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which provides that "no
bill, except general appropriations bills, shall be passed
containing more than one subject, which shall be dearly ex-
pressed in its title." But it appeals essentially to public policy:
It appears to me that the majority are reading into the
title of the Act a main objective or purpose not expressed
therein ... ; whereas the "real object as set forth in the
title is to bestow power upon the courts to authorize
blood tests under certain circumstances. I cannot give to
the phrase "the effect thereof" 6 the broad meaning given
by the majority ... In my opinion these words fail to
indicate reasonably the vast changes in the law which will
result from the view adopted by the majority. If its view
is adopted, then, in every proceeding, civil or criminal,
wherein paternity, parentage or the identity of a child is
involved (the child may be an infant or a septuagenarian),
the charge of illegitimacy may be raised by any party to the
litigation. Families may live together for many years
before this charge is asserted. This is dearly against all
reason, common sense, and morals, in the light of the
sanctity which we have given to the family unit in our way
of life.7
For ten years prior to the passage of the Uniform Act on
Blood Tests to Determine Paternity, Pennsylvania had had a
law providing for the submission of parties to blood grouping
tests under certain circumstances. In the cases arising under
this law, the courts were reluctant to permit an interpretation
of the statute that would add to the existing grounds for the
bastardization of a child. This law was known as the Act of
May 24, 1951, P. L. 402, 28 P. S. 306, and provided that
In any proceeding to establish paternity, the court,
on motion of the defendant, shall order the mother, her
6 The title of the act, as it appears in Pennsylvania law, is 'Uniform Act on
Blood Tests to Determine Paternity: An Act Authorizing the Court to
Order the Parties Under Certain Circumstances to Submit to Blood Group-
ing Tests Under Certain Conditions, and the Effects thereof."
7 Supra, note 1, 357-58.
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child, and the defendant to submit to one or more blood
grouping tests, by a duly qualified physician, to determine
whether or not the defendant can be excluded as being the
father of the child, and the results of such tests may be
received in evidence, but only in cases where definite
exclusion of the defendant is established.
In Commonwealth v. Hunscik,8 upon a charge and conviction of
fornication and bastardy, the defendant used in his defense
blood tests that excluded him as father of the bastard child
born to the prosecutrix. The court ruled:
Appellant's principal contention is that since he was
excluded as the child's father by the blood grouping tests,
the trial judge "must direct a verdict of not guilty." This
contention is based upon the provision of the Act of May
24, 1951 [quoting act]. The Act of 1951 does not accord
to blood grouping tests the conclusive effect for which
appellant contends. The statute merely provides that such
tests "may be received in evidence." 9
But it was to the case of Commonwealth ex. rel. O'Brien
v. O'Brien 10 that the court in the Goldman case devoted most
careful attention, for the critical difference between the wording
of the 1951 Act and that of the Uniform Act revealed the inten-
tion of the Legislature in incorporating the Uniform Act into
the body of Pennsylvania statutory law.
The O'Brien case was a proceeding by a former wife to
increase the amount of a support order entered in favor of her
and a daughter, and to include a son born before her divorce
but after separation from her husband. Disavowing paternity
of the son, the former husband moved for the compulsory blood
grouping test under the 1951 Act. The trial court dismissed the
motion. On appeal of the case to the intermediate court,
the husband contended that only the word "proceeding" in
the 1951 Act required interpretation to determine the scope of
the Act relative to appellant's request for a blood test to de-
8 182 Pa. Super. 639, 128 A.2d 169 (1956).
9Id. at 170-71.
10 182 Pa. Super. 584, 128 A.2d 164 (1956); 390 Pa. 551, 136 A.2d 451
(1957).
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termine the paternity of the child. But the court took the view
that "to establish paternity" were the really significant words
of the Act, and that the action at bar was not a proceeding
to establish paternity. The ruling opinion referred to the
existing presumptions of legitimacy:
The presumption of legitimacy is one of the strongest
known to the law. It stands until met with evidence which
makes it dearly appear that the husband cannot be the
father of the child [citation omitted].
... We do not find in the Act of 1951 a clear and
express mandate to depart from a rule which has been so
firmly established and so long followed.
... To uphold appellant's contention would mean
that paternity could be brought into issue in every sup-
port case. In view of the bitterness which frequently
exists between husband and wife at such a time, there is
little doubt that paternity would often be questioned for
the sole purpose of embarrassment and delay. To order a
blood grouping test in the case at bar would do more than
establish a new rule of evidence. It would create a whole
new philosophy concerning the presumption of legitimacy.
This we think the Legislature did not intend to do by the
Act of 1951."1
The dissenting opinion attacked the justification in public
policy for imposing a conclusive presumption of legitimacy
upon the parties:
... Not all rules of evidence are designed to determine
the truth, but some are designed to establish a desired
relationship between parties, or to strengthen family
ties. Assuming, without admitting, that there are socio-
logical reasons for establishing a conclusive presumption
of legitimacy when a child is born or conceived while
its mother and her husband are living together as husband
and wife, I can see no sociological or other reason to apply
a conclusive presumption of legitimacy when the mother
11 128 A.2d 164, 66.
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and her husband were, as here, "living apart" when the
child was conceived and born. 12
A divided court of last resort affirmed this decision, and
on the same grounds.]3 Considerations of public policy
again played a part in the contrasting opinions. The court
ruled:
It is true that the present proceeding is one in which
paternity is relevant or one in which paternity is an issue,
but it is not a proceeding brought to establish paternity.
In support actions brought by a wife against a husband for
support of a minor child born during wedlock, paternity
has already been established in the eyes of the law by
operation of the presumption of legitimacy of children
born during wedlock ... The presumption of legitimacy
is invoked at the very moment of birth and no further
proceedings are required to establish the paternity of the
child. This presumption is essential in any society in
which the family is the fundamental unit. 14
The dissenting opinion held that the majority had missed
the point at issue in invoking the presumption of legitimacy
at all:
... To hold that a "presumption" established a fact
"in the eyes of the law" is not only to look upon justice
as blindfolded, but to blind her by the law's own hand.
The very nature of a "presumption" is to permit it to be
rebutted by dear evidence to the contrary, and no evidence
known to the judicial process is more lucid and scientifically
certain than the blood grouping test when used to negative
paternity ... The ultimate vice of the majority opinion is
not merely the improper use of a "presumption" as a
substitute for fact, but the use of the presumption at all
... The only question is whether the Legislature intended
to narrowly limit the grant to defendants of a judicial
means of acquiring clearly admissible and relevant evidence,
12 Id. at 168.
13 390 Pa. 551, 136 A.2d 451 (1957).
14 Id. at 453.
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to only one class of defendants [those who have pur-
portedly fathered a child out of wedlock], or whether in
view of the broad language employed, a wider application
was intended. 15
The situation of the O'Brien and Goldman cases is the
same: a disaffected husband, faced with the imminence of a
court order compelling him to support children who he is sure
are not his own, petitions under the applicable statute for a
compulsory blood test in the hope that the test results will
scientifically exclude him from being the father.
In the O'Brien case the court twice rejected the petition
and refused to admit within the meaning of the language "a
proceeding to establish paternity" in the 1951 Act, a proceeding
to which paternity had acknowledged relevance.
But the language of section 1 of the Uniform Act, adopted
in 1961, left the court in the Goldman case no such opportunity
for a strict construction of the statute. The Goldman case
was a civil action in which paternity, parentage, or identity
of a child was a relevant fact; and the language of section 1
of the Act expressly provides for such situations.
The opinion in the O'Brien case ruled that only the nature
of the proceeding stood between the petitioner and the blood
test that he sought to have administered. In the Goldman case
the nature of the proceeding was the same, and the more gen-
eral language of the Uniform Act now compelled sanction of
the tests.
Another reason for the court's reluctance in the Goldman
case to find authorization in the statute for granting the
blood test is that presumably, having followed the way
indicated by the language of section 1 of the Uniform Act, the
15 Id. at 455-56. A 1959 Pennsylvania case referred approvingly to the O'Brien
case on the issue of the strength of the presumption of legitimacy. This
was Commonwealth v. Carrasquilla, 191 Pa. Super. 14, 155 A.2d 473.
In this case the prosecutrix proceeded for neglect to support a child born
out of wedlock. Although the prosecutrix was separated from her hus-
band, no decree of divorce had issued prior to the conception of the child.
Held: in view of the strength of the presumption of legitimacy, the
evidence, for failing to show non-access of the husband beyond a reason-
able doubt, was insufficient to sustain a conviction.
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court must also follow the language of section 5 of the Act if
the test results excluded the husband from being the father of
the child in question. For then the court must allow the
findings of those tests to overcome any presumptions of the
legitimacy of children born during wedlock, however con-
clusive at common law.
This the court in the O'Brien case would certainly not have
wanted to do. In fact, in reasoning that the case was not a
proceeding to establish paternity, the court presumed that the
operation of law had already established it. A fortiori, then,
paternity being established, the case at bar could not possibly
be such a proceeding.
Nor has Pennsylvania alone travailed over the quantum of
inviolability that the law may feel free to construct about the
noumenon of a family in order to protect it. These are the
jurisdictions that have enacted the Uniform Act on Blood Tests
to Determine Paternity:





Panama Canal Zone February 1963
In their versions of the Uniform Act, California and Oregon
omit section 5.1 6
Those adopting the Act have approached in two ways the
question whether, as between the revealed truth of science and
the considered experience of law, science will prevail. The
designers of the Uniform Act recognized that a given man is
either the father of a given child, or is not; the two conditions
cannot simultaneously obtain. Pennsylvania, Illinois, and the
Canal Zone now face a literal application of this logic to
those uncertain areas in which the ancient and arbitrary
presumptions of legitimacy would formerly have been deci-
sive.'1 The other jurisdictions that have adopted the Act have
16 9 ULA 104.
17 California's Conclusive Presumption of Legitimacy-Its Legal Effect and its
Questionable Constitutionality, 35 SO. CAL. L. REV. 437, 454 (1962).
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nonetheless enabled their courts, for reasons of public policy,
to indulge in the irrationality of imposing paternity of a child
upon a husband who the science of genetics incontrovertibly
determines is not its father. 18
California and Oregon are two jurisdictions that have
enacted the Uniform Act without section 5. This omission
permits them to retain the presumptions of legitimacy already
extant in their law. Two California cases demonstrate how a
court can facilitate the imposition of paternity upon a hus-
band in spite of the contradictory results of blood grouping
tests.
Kusior v. Silvers was an action to establish paternity
and to provide for support of a child born to plaintiff nine
days after the entry of a final decree of divorce. The court
held that blood tests showing the husband could not have been
the father still did not preclude the court from giving in-
structions regarding the conclusive presumption of legitimacy:
In Hill v. Johnson [citation omitted], a wife who was
living in the same house with her husband at all times ...
brought suit against a third party for support. Blood
tests disclosed that the husband could not have been the
father. . . "Evidence of the result of a blood test is to be
considered with all other evidence in the case and is not
conclusive. It was error to admit the evidence since it is
contrary to the conclusive presumption of legitimacy."
The Hill case was decided in 1951, and the Legislature in
1953 enacted our version of the Uniform Act on Blood Tests
to Determine Paternity, providing. . . "If the court finds
that the conclusions of all the experts ... are that the
alleged father is not the father of the child, the question of
paternity shall be resolved accordingly" [citation omitted].
However, the Legislature significantly refrained from
adopting section 5 of the Uniform Act...
... It is apparent that the failure of the Legislature to
enact that part of the Act which would specifically have
18 Exclusionary Blood Tests it Disputed Paternity Proceedings, 18 NYU
INTRA. L. REV. 437, 454 (1962).
1 7 Cal. Rptr. 129, 354 P.2d 657 (1960).
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enabled the result of a blood test to overcome the con-
dusive presumption declared in the Code Civ. Proc. #1962,
subd. 5, must be deemed an intention not to change the
rule stated in Hill v. Johnson, supra.
Moreover, section 1962, subd. 5, was amended in
1955 by the addition of the emphasized words "notwith-
standing any other provision of law, the issue of a wife co-
habiting with her husband who is not impotent is indis-
putably presumed to be legitimate." 2 o
In Oregon, in the absence of any cases, ORS 109.070
would apply: "The child of a wife cohabiting with her hus-
band who is not impotent shall be conclusively presumed to
be the child of her husband, whether or not the marriage of
the husband and wife may be void."
No cases in point have yet appeared in Illinois or the
Panama Canal Zone.
In general, jurisdictions which in disputed paternity
cases accept as conclusive evidence blood tests excluding a
party from paternity also extend the principle unaltered to
cases affecting the legitimacy of children born in wedlock. 21
Other jurisdictions in general hold evidence that the results
of blood grouping tests indicate nonpaternity is not con-
clusive on the question of disputed paternity, but is merely
entitled to the same weight as other evidence.22
Virginia law is silent on the relevance of blood tests to
conclusive presumptions of legitimacy. The inference there-
20 Id. at 667. The court affirmed this same position a year later in Wareham
v. Wareham, 15 'Cal. Rptr. 465, 195 Cal. App. 2d. 64 (1961), which
was a proceeding to modify an interlocutory decree of divorce. Blood
tests excluded the husband from being the father of the child whose
paternity was in issue. At the same time, there was evidence to the
effect that at the time of the child's possible conception the wife was
cohabiting with her husband. The court ruled that the statutory con-
clusive presumption of legitimacy applied. The Southern California Law
Review article (supra, note 17) reviews a quarter century of similar
California decisions.
21 C. v. C., 200 Misc. 631, 109 NYS 276 (1951); Houston v. Houston, 199
Misc. 469, 99 NYS 2d 199 (1950); but Cf. Complaint of Dunn, 203
Misc. 181, 115 NYS 2d 348 (1952).
22State by Doloff v. Sargent, 100 N.H. 29, 118 A.2d 596 (1955).
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fore may be drawn that in Virginia, in cases in which the
paternity of a child born in wedlock is in issue, the results of
blood grouping tests cannot, per se, rebut the presumption
that the child is legitimate. 23
A strong tradition of law, then, stands in the way of the
ready acceptance of the Uniform Act on Blood Tests to Determine
Paternity in the form in which the Commission on Uniform
Laws approved it. Two of the six jurisdictions that have
adopted it have deliberately modified it to permit them to
sustain that same tradition. The available case from the
jurisdictions that have adopted the Act in its entirety shows a
court applying it as written with evident reluctance to do so.
23 The Virginia courts' position on the evidence sufficient to overcome the
common law presumption of legitimacy appears in Watkins v. Carlton,
10 Leigh (37 Va.) 586, 601-02 (1840); Reynolds v. Adams, 125 Va.
295, 99 S.E. 695 (1919); Hoover v. Hoover, 131 Va. 522, 109 S.E. 424
(1920); and Parker v. Harcum, 201 Va. 441, 111 S.. 2d 444 (1959).
